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Incorporating International Human Rights Law in
National Constitutions: The South African Experience
By Penelope E. Andrews
A. Introduction

.

In his 1931 lectures at the University ofldaho College of Law, Professor Manley
0. Hudson reflected on the benefits and possibilities of a global legal order. His
vision was one in which the global community of states engaged with, and relied
upon, the imprimatur of international law. 1 This vision incorporated the idea of
the United States as a good global citizen, generating an international agenda of
human rights and good governance. 2 Even though Professor Hudson's insights
predated the establishment of the United Nations and the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, his sentiments were very much in line
with chose that spurred, the creation of the modern international legal order.
The focus of this book is partly to revisit that vision, and partly to explore the
universal ramifications of that vision. What I intend to do in this chapter is co
assess the challenge of incorporating and applying international law within
national legal frameworks, and more specifically international human rights law,
by examining one case study, namely, South Africa. In particular, I will examine
how this newly democratized country has incorporated international law into its
national legal framework, and the possibilities for democracy and human rights
chat are generated by such incorporation.
This examination is important because the transition from apartheid to democracy
in South Africa was of momentous global significance. This democratic transformation, from a country steeped in authoritarianism and racism, to one predicated on
international human rights principles, including peaceful co-existence,3 transparency
and accountability, involved the international community at all stages. 4 _The struggle

1

2

3

See generally MANLEY 0. HuosoN, PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI ZATION (1932).
ld.atl03-117.
Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. The President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SALR 637
(CC) at para. 3 (S. Afr.) (stating, "[t]he Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past

Miller & Brntspies (Eds), Progress in lncernational Law, pp. 835-854 .
© 2008 Koninklijke Brill NV, Printed in the Netherlands.
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against apartheid had an enormous impact on the development of international
human rights law, specifically the evolving international principles geared toward the
proscription of apartheid and racism. 5 Indeed, apartheid was declared a crime against
humanity by the United Nations in 1966.6 Moreover, the struggle against racism and
for self-determination, pursued mostly by formerly colonized communities, was
informed by global abhorrence to the policies of apartheid, as illustrated by the
numerous resolutions passed by the United Nations against the apartheid government.7 The post-apartheid democratic state became the first to incorporate international human rights principles into its Constitution, and into the structure of its
system of governance. 8
This chapter assesses the human rights project in South Africa by examining
first, how international law has been incorporated in South Africa's Bill of Rights.
Second, this chapter explores the interpretation of these rights by the South
African Constitutional Court, and more specifically, how the Court has embraced
international human rights principles in its jurisprudence. This exploration also
involves examining the strategic choices made by the Court as to how it will
adopt those principles and under what conditions, as well as when it chooses to
reject those international human rights principles in favor of a localized reading.
Finally, this chapter concludes by examining some lessons to be learned from this
experience, and in particular how the adoption of international legal principles
by the South African Constitutional Court may provide lessons for countries
both similarly and differently situated.

4

5

6

7

8

of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, co nAicc, untold suffering and injustice, and a
future founded on the recognitio n of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence ... ") .
See generally, Loms B. SOHN, RI GHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH AFrucA
(l 994).
Id.; See also H enry J. Richardso n, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African
Bantustan Policy, 17 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 ( 1978); EDGAR BROOKES, APARTHEID (1968);
BRIAN BuNTING, THE RisE OF THE SouTH AFRICAN REICH (1986) ; Arthur J. Goldberg,
The Status ofApartheid Under International Law, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (1985).
Internacional Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov.
30, 1973, 101 5 U.N .T.S. 243.
Kevin Hopkins, Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International
Law and its Part in the South African Transformation, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 24 1
(200 1-2002). See, e.g., Decade for Action co Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 3057 (XXVlII), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 11 9/ 15 (Nov. 2, 1973). See, e.g., Resolution Against
Aparth eid in Spores G.A. Res. 40/64, U.N. Doc. N40/53 (D ec. 10, 1985).
For a derailed exploration of the Sauth African Co nsti tution, see generally, THE PosT APARTHEID
CONSTITUTIONS (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellman n , eds., 2001).
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B. From Apartheid to Democracy
The period preceding the establishment of the United Nations involved a brief
moment of global optimism, one that also involved South Africa. Indeed, Jan Smuts,
the Prime Minister of South Africa at the time, was President of the Committee on
the General Assembly of the United Nations, and served as a principal drafter of the
Charter of the United Nations. 9 But South Africa's positive involvement in this exercise of global governance was shorclived. In 1948, the Nationalist Party came to
power in South Africa on a platform ofwhite supremacy, embarking on a Kafkaesque
project to separate cl1e citizens of South Africa according to clearly demarcated racial
groups.10 This project was bolstered by a legal system designed to ensure that all
aspects of life, including work, marriage, education, health, and cravel1 were rigidly
regulated. 11 In addition, a brutal security and police apparatus made certain that
these laws were obeyed and that political dissent was stifled. 12 A cursory reading of
the volumes of the reports of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission bear testimony to the grotesque lengths the apartheid government
went, to ensure that the system was reinforced. 13
This system of apartheid increasingly became of concern to the global community, even as the apartheid government was hiding behind the principle of state
sovereignty. 14 Indeed, it is arguable that the state-centric model of international
law confronted some ch:illenge, as the United Nations and many governments
across the world began to recognize the anti-apartheid opposition movements,
and particularly the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress,

9
10

11

12

13

14

SOHN, supra note 4.
In pursuit of chis goal, the aparth eid government passed a series of statutes co institutionalize racial discrimin ation. These statutes included: Population Ace of 1950; Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act of 1949; Group Areas Act of 1950; The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of
1959. See APARTHEID: THE FACTS, INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND Am FuND (1982) [hereinafter
APARTHEID: THE fACTS].
APARTHEID: THE FACTS, supra note 10.
See generally, JOHN DuGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1982);
see also rNTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAw
(Geofrey Bindman ed., 1988).
See Truth and Reconcil iation Commission, Final Report, http://www.doj.gov..za/rrc/report/
execsum.hcm. See also, Penelope E. Andrews, Reparatiom for Apartheid's Victims: 7he Path to
Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1155 (2004); KADER AsMAL, ET AL., REcoNCILIATION
THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 1997).
See African National Congress, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ misc/trc03.html; see also Jacquie Cassette, Towards Justice in the Wake
ofArmed Conflicts? 7he Evolution o/Warm Crimes Tribunals, 9 African Security Review (2000),
http://www.iss.co.za/ pubs/ ASR/9No5And6/Cassecce. html# Anchor-Conven cion-9012.
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as representing the majority of South Africans. 15 In addition, once apartheid was
deemed a crime against humanity by the United Nations, 16 the constant objections of the South African government co the international consensus against
apartheid, could not relieve it of its duty to abide by the new international norms.
Apartheid South Africa is a commonly cited example for the international law
principle chat the persistent objector rule does not apply where the customary
international law involves a jus cogens norm. 17
The international struggle against apartheid underpinned the global fight
against racism. Many key documents of international human rights law proscribing racism, most specifically the International Convention of Elimination of All
Forms of Racism, 18 were developed in response to apartheid. Indeed Henry
Richardson, 19 Louis Sohn 20 and John Dugard21 have in their scholarship traced
the link berween international law and apartheid.22
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when the end of apartheid became inevitable, negotiations commenced in South Africa about the shape
of the future constitutional democracy. These negotiations centered on a range of
issues relevant to democratic governance, including the question of human rights.
The general consensus abour the inclusion of civil and political rights in a Bill of
Rights was established immediacely. 23 This was not surprising, in the wake of
apartheid and its systematic denial of a range of civil and political rights.
The consensus about the inclusion of social and economic rights, and in particular, their justiciability, came later. For despite the recognition that the processes of
apartheid had effectively institutionalized economic inequality, and that the majority
of black South Africans languished in poverty, there was not general agreement about
how to attain economic equity. 24
15

16

17

18

19

20
21

22

23

24

See G.A. Res. 37/69, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/69 (Dec. 9, 1982) (calling on the international
community to reaffirm "the legitimacy of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national
liberation movement ....") .
Internatio nal Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov.
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243,246.
See Jon athan I. Charney, 7he Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRJT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African
Bantustan Policy, 17 CowM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978)
See SOl·IN, supra note 4.
See DuGARD, supra note 12.
For a thoughtful discussion dn apartheid and international law, see Goldberg, supra note 5.
See THE SMALL MIRACLE: SOUTH AFRJCAS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (Doreen Atkinson &
Stephen Friedman eds., 1994).
See Center for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Introduction to Socio-Economic Righrs in
the Sou th African Constitution, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ centre_projects/socio/ compilation 1 part l.
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This also was not surprising. Although the national liberation movements had
largely been committed to policies of economic redistribution, by the 1990s the
international consensus had shifted to one in which human rights were embodied
not by redistribution of material resources in the world, but in legal texts such as
bills of rights. Indeed Upendra Baxi, the Indian legal scholar, has articulated how
this text-based version of human rights discourse was seeking to "supplant all
other ethical discourses." 25 In a similar vein, Boa de Sousa Santos, the Portuguese
scholar, has noted how human rights has become the lingua franca of "progressive
politics," providing an "emancipatory script" for those seeking redress from
injustice. 26
The South African Constitution and its expansive Bill of Rights reflects this
paradigmatic shift in the characterization and articulation of h:iman rights
norms. In addition, the South African Constitution represents a vindication of
decades of human rights activism, not just because of its expressed human rights
commitment in the Bill of Rights, but also because the Constitution made South
Africa, formally at least, a version of the penultimate human rights state.27 As
Makau wa Mutua, the Kenyan human rights scholar notes:
The construction of the post-apartheid state represents the first deliberate and calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state - a polity that is primarily
animated by human rights norms. South Africa was the first state to be reborn
after the universal acc,eptance (at least rhetorically) of human rights ideals by states
of all the major cultural and political traditions. 28

If one looks at the trajectory of human rights discourse during the decades following the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including
those shameful periods when human rights became hostage to cold war politics,
the South Africa embrace of human rights principles provided a welcoming ray
of hope.

25

26

27

28

html; see also Nicholas Haysom, Giving Effect to Socio-Economic Rights, Community Law Center,
Socio-Economic Rights Project, Vol. 1 No. 4 (March 1999) at 1, http://www.communitylawcentre
.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Righcs/esr-review (follow "Download chis edition if1 pelf format"
hyperlink).
Upendra Baxi, voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L J. OF L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 147 (1998).
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception ofHuman Rights, I ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1 (1997) (F.R.G.).
Makau wa Mucua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse,
10 HARv. HuM. Rrs. L. J. 63 (1997).
Id. ac 65.
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C. 7he South African Constitution
The South African Constitution reflects not only the influence of the global human
rights struggle, but is in many ways a by-product of that struggle. The Constitution
embraces international law in several ways. 29 First, the Constitution's comprehensive
Bill of Rights30 is drawn entirely from several human rights instruments, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 31 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural rights. 32 The Bill of Rights is expansive, incorporating a range of civil and
political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.33 Implicit in this comprehensive embrace of rights is the notion that rights are interdependent, and that
civil and political rights reinforce social and economic rights, and vice-versa. 34 This
recognition implicitly eschews a bifurcated or hierarchical approach to rights, in
favor of one that views all rights as integral to the pursuance of digniry and equiry.
This vision is further bolstered by the provisions of Article 38 in the Bill of Rights,
which explicitly renders all rights justiciable. 35
The second way that the Constitution incorporates international law is chat
Article 39 of the Constitution specifically directs the South African courts co consider international law in their deliberations. 36 Finally, Article 232 of the
Constitution provides for the direct incorporation of international law into the

29

30

31
32

33

34

35

36

For a thoughtful analysis of the engagement of the South African Constitution with international
law, see John Dugacd, International Law and the 'Final' Constitution, 11 SAJHR 241 (1995).
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, The Bill of Ri ghts, ch. 2, available at http://www. info.gov.za/documencs/
co ns ti tu tion/i ndex. h cm .
1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 17 1 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30. For a thoughtful discuss ion on th e incorporation of
social and eco nomi c rights in the S. AFR. CONST. 1996, see Sa ndra Liebenberg, 7he International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for South Africa, 11 SAJHR
359 (1995).
See NEIL MAcCoRMICK, LEGAL RiGHTS AND SocIAL D EMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42 (1982).
See Pierre De Vos, Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights? Social and Economic Rights
in South Africa's 1996 Constitution, 13 SAJHR 67 (1997); see also Penelope E. Andrews, 7he
South African Bill of Rights: Lessons for Australia, in CoMPARATrvE PERSPECTIVES ON BILLS OF
RiGHTS (Chri stine Debono & Tania Colwell eds., 2004).
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 39 provides chat, "(w]hen considering che Bill of Rights,
a co urt ... must consider international law .... § 233 provides that, "when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislati on th at is co nsistent
with international law over any afternative interpretation that is incons istent w ith international
law." (emphasis added).

Incorporating International Hu man Rights Law in Natio nal Constitutions

841

South African legal syscem .37 South Africa is party to several international human
rights instruments that range from the elimination of racial discrimination, slavery
and genocide, the suppression of human trafficking, the rights of women, children
and refugees.38 Article 37-4 (6)(1) of the C onstitution specifically provides that
emergency legislation enacted m ay derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the
extent that it is consistent with South Africa's obligations under international
law. 39
In its founding provisions, the Constitution outlines the human rights principles
on which the new democratic state is promised. These include:
•
•
•
•

Human dignity, th e achievem ent of equality and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms
Non-racialism and non-sexism
Suprem acy of the constitution and the rule of law
Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter's roll , regular elections and
a mulci-party system of dem ocratic government, to ensure accountability
responsiveness and openness.40

The C onstitution, with its expansive Bill of Rights, has been universally heralded
for the ran ge of protections it affords, and the purpos ive m anner in whi ch it
affords such protections. 4 1 For exampl e, the Bill of Rights ouclaws both direct
and indirect discrimination, an approach chat reflects a deep appreciation of the
invidious m anner in which discrimination is manifest, both consciously and
unconsciously. 42 The Bill of Rights contains a general commitment to equality
before the law and equal protection under the law, and provides several grounds

37

38

39
40
41

42

Id. § 232 specifi cal ly provid es char customary intern ati onal law is rhe law of South Africa unless
such law co ntradicts th e Co nstituti on o r an Act of Parliament. § 23 1 outlines the co ndi tio ns
under which intern atio nal agreements become part of So uth Africa n law. § 198 provides rhar
th e Security services must act "in accordance with .. . customary international law and international agreements ...."
See Human Ri ghts & Documentatio n Centre, Gender Issues and Democracy in So uthern
Africa, http://www.hrd c. unam.n a/rsa_hr.hrm.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 37(4)(b)(i) .
Id. §§ 1-6.
See Karl Kl are, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR 146 (1 998);
see also C raig Sco tt & Philip Alsto n, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16 SAJHR 206 (2000).
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, para. 4 provides rhar, "[n] o person may discri minate
directly or indirectly agai nst any one on one or more grounds." Fo r an interesting discussion on the
subliminal manner in which, fo r example, racism is often man ifest, see Charles Lawrence, 7he Id,
the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN . L. REv. 317 (1987).
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on which the states may not unfairly discriminate, including race, color, gender,
religion, ethnicity, age, disability and sexual orientation. 43 In addition, the Bill of
Rights recognizes that sometimes these grounds of discrimination overlap,
and therefo re incorporates protections against the intersectionality of different
grounds of discriminarion. 44 The Bill of Rights protects the human rights of
women, and in particular seeks to respond to the phenomenon of violence against
women in several ways, including the outlawing of violence "from either public
or private sources."45 Drawing from the African concept of ubuntu, 46 the Bill of
Rights provides for the right to have one's dignity respected and protected.47
In particular, the following civil and political rights are protected: the right to
life,48 freedom and security of the person, 49 the right against slavery, servitude and
forced labor,5° the right to privacy, freedom of religion, belief, expression, opinion,
assembly, movement, association 51 and a range of property52 and labor rights.53 In
addition, the Constitution also incorporates the right of access to information,54
to due process, the right to a fair trial and access to the courrs. 55 All of these rights
derive from chose incorporated in the Universal D eclaration of Human Rights

43

44

45

S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, para. 3 provides chat " (c]he state may not unfairly discriminate direccly or indirectl y aga inst anyone on one o r more grou nds, including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disabiliry,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth ."
Id. § 9, para. 5 provides chat, "[d]iscrimination on one or more grounds ... is unfair unless it is established chat che discrimination is fair." (emphasis added) . This concept of incersecci onaliry has
been analyzed in some deta il by critical race scholars. See e.g., Kimberley Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margim: lntersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Agaimt Women of Color, in IDENTITIES
175 (Linda Alcoff & Eduardo Mendieta eds., 2002); see also Angela H arris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 581 (1991).
Id. § 12(l)(c) provides chat, " (e]veryo ne has the right co securiry and freedom of che person
which includes che right . .. co be free from all forms of violence from ei ther public o r private
sources ...."

46

47

48
49

50
5'

52
53
54

55

For an explanation of ubuntu, see Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuncu and che Law in So uth
Africa at http:/ /epf.ecoporc. org/appendix3.hcml.
S. AFR. CoNST. 1996, supra note 30, provides th at, "[e)veryo ne has inherent di gniry and the
right co have their digniry respected and protected."

Id. § 11.
Id. § 11-12.
Id.§ 13.
Id.§ 15-18.
Id.§ 25.
Id. § 22-23.
Id. § 32.
Id. § 33-35.
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In a series of cases,
the South African Constitutional Court has interpreted the relevant constitutional
right in light of the international human rights document from which it derives,
thereby interpreting such international document in the South African context. 56
For example, in S v Baloyi, 57 in balancing the procedural rights of the accused, on
the one hand, and the need to stem private violence against women, on the other,
the Constitutional Court interpreted South Africa's obligations under the United
Nations Declaration on Violence Against Women 58 and Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 59 to reject a
challenge to the constitutionality of domestic violence legislation. 60
In addition to these so-called first-generation rights, the Bill of Rights incorporates a range of socio-economic rights, including the right to an environment
that is beneficial, 61 the right to have access to housing, 62 health care, 63 food, water,
social security, 64 education. 65 Theses social and economic rights are not available
on demand, as first-generation rights are. That said, the state must provide these
rights "within its available resources". 66 Drawing from the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 67 the Bill of Rights provides for a series of children's rights,
protecting them from abuse, but also providing for a host of socio-economic
rights that they are entitled to, including the right to basic nutrition, health care,
shelter and social services.68

56

57
58

59

60
61
62
63

64
65

66
67

68

For example, in the first case heard by the Constitutional Court that involved the abolition of
the death penalty, the Court went through an extended analysis of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (S. Afr.).
G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. , Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/49 (Dec. 20,
1993).
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sepe.
3, 1981).
S v Baloyi, supra note 57, at para. 13.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 24.
Id.§ 26.
Id.§ 27.

Id.
Id.§ 29.
Id.
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR,
4th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sepe. 2,
1990).
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 28.
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Under South African law, several bodies are mandated to pursue the human
rights embodied in the Constitution, including: the Public Protector; 69 the Human
Rights Commission; 70 the Commission for Gender Equality/I the Electoral
Commission72 and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities. 73 Of these bodies, the
Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission are central to the implementation and enforcement of the human rights embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The establishment of two separate bodies with ostensibly similar functions, albeit
the one focusing only on gender, created controversy. Many women advocates were
of the opinion chat a structure such as a Gender Commission would marginalize
and even trivialize women's equality. 74 They believed chat the pursuit of women's
rights should be incorporated into a structure chat promotes rights for all.7 5
Opponents argue chat only a separate body can deal comprehensively with gender
equality concerns and develop a sustained and systemic approach to the eradication of sexism and pacriarchy. 76 In the final analysis, the latter sentiments held sway
and a separate body, the Gender Commission, was established. In addition to the
constitutionally mandated bodies, several human rights bodies, including the office
of the Status ofWomen, of the Office on the Rights of the Child and the Office on
the Rights of People with Disabilities, have been set up in the office of the
President.

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

Id. § 182, empoweri ng the Public Protector to "investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the
public admini stration, or in any sp here of government that is alleged or suspected to be improper
or to result in any impropriety or prej udi ce ...."
The Human Rights Commission is mandated to: "promote respect for human ri ghts and a
cultu re of hum an rights; promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights;
monitor an d assess the observance of human ri ghts" in South Africa. Id. § 184 .
The Co mmiss ion for Gender Equality is empowered to "promote respect for ge nder equali ty,
and the protection, developm ent and attai nment of gen der equali ty . ..." Id. § 187.
The task of the Electoral Com missio n is to "manage elections" and to "ensure that they are free
and fair." Id. § 190.
As its name suggests, th e Comm iss ion is mandated to "promote respect for the ri ghts of cultural,
reli gious and lingu istic co mmunities; to promote and develop peace, fri endship, humanity, tolerance and national unity amongst cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on th e basis
of equality, non-discrimination and free association ... ." Id. § 185 .
See Catherin e Albertyn, National Machinery for Ensuring Gender Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF SouTH AFrucA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTivE 17 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995); see also
Catherin e Albertyn, Women a,:Jd the Transition to Democracy in South Africa, in GENDER AND
THE SOUTH AFRJCAN LEGAL O~ER 39 (Christina Murray ed. 1994).
For an interestin g discuss ion of this debate, see Albertyn, National Machinery for Ensuring
Gender Equality, sup ra note 74, at 16- 17.
See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South Africa, in 3
MICH.). RAcE & L. 307, 330-331 (1998).
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D. The jurisprudence ofthe Constitutional Court and International Law
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has adopted a bold vision of human
rights in its jurisprudence. Since its inception in 1995, the Constitutional Court
has heard several cases that directly implicate the international human rights
agenda embodied in the C onstitution. In this endeavor the Constitutional Court
has incorporated international human rights law in its interpretation of the Bill of
Rights, and by doing so has spawned an international human rights jurisprudence
that continues to be cited in many jurisdictions.77 Indeed, the international human
rights legal literature constantly references the transform ative human rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court. 78
The Court's docket has included international legal issues in seve,al landmark
cases. The first case that the Court heard in 1995, S v M akwanyane, concerned the
constitutionality of the death penalty. 79 The Court, invoking the right to life and
right to dignity found in the Bill of Rights, the International Covenant on C ivil
and Political Rights, and other human rights instruments, struck down the death
penalty as unconstitutional.80 In this case, the Constitutional Court demonstrated
its central role in the democratic transform ation process in South Africa. The case,
littered with references to international law, including the International Covenant
on C ivil and Political Rights, 8 1 and foreign law, including the United States
Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia8 2 has demonstrated that its approach
was jurisprudentially expansive, as opposed to a more self-referential approach
taken by the United Scates Supreme C ourt, for example.
In a series of cases, the Court examined the question of equality, the paramount
principle in the Bill of Rights and in international law. Exploring a range of factual
situations, including those involving the rights of HN positive persons not to be
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See Jennifer L. Hube, Legal Representation for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 5 D u KE J . Co MP. &
l NT'L L. 425 (1995) (ci ting S v Baloyi); Alan C larke, Terrorism, Extradition and the Death Penalty,
29 WM . MITCHELL L. REv. 803 (2003); M artha L. Salomon, AIDS is Risky Business: Examining
the Effects ofthe AIDS Crisis on Publicly Traded Companies in South Africa and the Implications for
Both South African and US. Investors, 37 VAN D. J. TRANSNAT' L L. 1473 (2004).
78
See, eg., Klare, supra note 4 1; see also, DENN IS D Av1s, D EMOCRACY AND D ELIBERATION (1 999) .
79 S v M akwanyane, supra note 56 .
so Id., para. 15 1.
81

82

Adopted and opened for signature, ratifi catio n and accession by G.A. Res. 2200A (XXl), U .N.
GAOR, 2 1st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U .N. D oc. A/63 19 (Dec. 16, 1966) (en tered in to fo rce Ma r.
23 1976)( mencioned at para. 62) .
4 08 U. S. 238 (1 972) (mentioned at para. 40).
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discriminated against in their employment, 83 the rights of permanent residents not
to be treated unfairly in comparison to citizens in the workplace, 84 the rights of
homosexuals to be engage in consenting sexual conduct85 and the rights of African
girls and women not to be discriminated against under indigenous customary law, 86
the Court has formulated a substantive vision of equality.87 In doing so the Court
has moved from a mere formal approach to one that recognizes the peculiar realities
of South Africa and has attempted to contextualize equality within the South African
context.88 The court has accomplished this by embracing international human rights
principles, whilst at the same time recognizing the peculiar context of South Africa's
history of inequality, and the need to develop a comprehensive indigenous version
of equality. 89
This was demonstrated in one of the earliest cases that analyzed the right to
equality, in which the court was confronted with a challenge by a convicted male
prisoner to a Presidential Pardon. 90 The challenged Presidential Pardon, issued by
President Nelson Mandela after South Africa's first democratic election, had pardoned certain categories of prisoners, including women in prison who had
children under the age of twelve. 91 The complainant challenged the Presidential
Pardon on the basis that it violated his constitutional rights to equality and that
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84

85

86

87

88

89

90
91

Hoffman v S. Afr. Airways 200 1 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (unan imously holding that the airline
could not exclude an otherwise qual ified asympto matic HIV-positive job applicant and rejecting
the ai rline's eco nomi c interests as co mpelling when balanced against the infringement of the
applicant's right to equality).
Larbi-Odam v Member of the Exec. Council For Educ. (Nw Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC)
(S. Afr.) (unanimously invalidati ng a regulation th at prohibited foreign citizens from permanent
employment as teachers in state schools).
Nar'l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (declaring unco nstitutional th e common law offense of sodomy and applicable criminal laws on
sodo my).
BHE v Mag. (1) SA 563 (CC) (S . Afr.) (finding th e inheritance rules for black estates found in
the Black Administration Act and the system of male primogeniture in African customary law
inconsistent with the Constitution) .
See Catherine Albertyn & Jan et Kentridge, Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim
Constitution, 10 SAJHR 149 (1994).
See Pierre de Vos, Grootboom, the Right ofAccess to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual
Fairness, 17 SAJHR 258 (2001).
A classic example was AZAPO v Pres. of the Rep ublic of S. Afr., supra note 3, in which th e
Constitutional Court struck down a chall enge to the amn esty provisions of th e Truth and
Reconciliation Com mission. Refognizing the important international human rights principles
implicated in the amnesty provisions, the Court nonetheless rejected the international law approach, in favor of che principles agreed co during South Africa's negotiations towards a constitutional democracy.
President of the Republic of S. Afr.~ Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Presidential Act No. 17 of 1994.
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it discriminated against him on the basis of sex. The C ourt, in its judgm ent,
engaged in a comprehensive discussion of equality.
Applying the tes t outlined in the Constitution, the C ourt found chat the discrimination was unfair. 92 But the Co urt also found that the discrimination could
be justified because of the benefits derived from the pardon, including those that
accrued co children and their m ochers; 93 in the C ourt's opinion , the latter was
clearly the most disadvantaged gro up in South African society. Although
acknowledging that its findin gs may reinfo rce a stereotype about women, child
caring and child rearing, the C ourt recognized that mothers are the prim ary
caregivers of children. The C ourt saw its approach as pragmatic: one that placed
the issue squarely within the reality of the South Afri can context. Finding the
discrimination valid, th e Court stated chat because women have hiswrically been
discriminated against, the adoption of chis contextual approach would benefit
women, and not perpetuate a disadvantage.94 A li teral reading of the Court's
judgment suggests a contradiction of one of the principles incorporated in The
Convention on the Elim ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(C EDAW) , namely, chat state parties need:
To ensure chat family education includes a proper understanding of materni ty as a
social fun ction and the recognition of the common responsibili ty of men and
women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood
chat the interest of che,children is the primordial co nsideration in all cases. 95
The dissent forcefully challenged the pragmatic approach taken by the majority
and the stereotypes chat the majority appeared to perpetuate, stating very clearly
chat the Constitution was m eant to be transformative.96 But the m ajority judgment, despite the dissent, reflected that the judges interpreted the Constitution
as not just providing a formal flavor to equality. They grappled with both the
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The Constitution articulates a two-part test fo r fi nding discrimination. First, if discri minati on is
alleged and found on any of th e listed grounds, such as race, gender, marital status or natio nality, that findin g creates a presumption of un fa irness. The perso n agai nst who m the al legati on of
discriminatio n is made must then rebut the presumption of un fai rness by showing the validity
of th e acti on. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, paras. I & 5.
President of the Republic ofS. Afr. v Hugo, supra no te 90, paras. 39 & 47.
"In this case, moth ers have been afforded an advantage on the basis of a proposition that is ge nerally speaki ng true. There is no doubt that the goal of equality entrenched in our constitu tio n
were better served if the responsibilities fo r child rearing were more fa irly shared between mothers and fat hers. The simp le fact of the matter is that at present they are not. For the moment
th en, and for so me time to co me, mothers are go ing to carry greater burdens than fa thers in the
rearing of child ren. We cann ot ignore th is cru cial fac t in considering the impact of discrimination in this case." Id., (judgment of Jus tice O 'Regan at 113).
Arti cle 5(6), http://www. un .org/wo menwatch/daw/cedaw/tex t/econven ti on.htm#article5.
President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Hugo, supra no te 90, at 63 (judgment of Justice Kriegler) .
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contemporary realities of formal equality in South Africa, and the deeply
entrenched patterns of gender equality, one of the legacies of apartheid. As so
eloquently stated by Justice O'Regan:
To determine whether the discrimination is unfair it is necessary co recognize that
although the long-term goal of our constitutional order is equal treatment, insisting
upon equal treatment in circumstances of established inequality may well result in
the entrenchment of that inequality. 97

In its approach to curbing violence against women, several decisions of the Court
have been particularly compelling. In these decisions, the Court utilized the imperatives in the Bill of Rights, as well as those found in international instruments such
as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women 98 and the Vienna Declaration on Violence Against Women. 99 The
Court adopted a purposive approach, outlining very clearly in its pronouncements
the need to eradicate the ubiquitous problem of violence against women in South
Africa, and has applied this approach in both the public as well as the private law
arena. In S v Baloyi, a challenge to South Africa's domestic violence legislation, the
Court has articulated clearly that while it will protect the procedural rights of those
accused of domestic violence, it will ensure that the constitutional mandate that
prohibits all forms of violence, including violence committed in the home, be
clearly pursued to protect women. 100 Justice Albie Sachs, writing an impressive
judgment for the majority noted:
All crime has harsh effects on society. What distinguishes domestic violence is its hidden repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and in particular, on family life. It cuts across class, race, culture and geography, and is all the
more pernicious because it is so often concealed and so frequently goes unpunished. 101
The Court, reinforcing its commitment to stemming public violence against
women, has held the police and other government authorities liable where they
negligently failed to protect women from violence committed by third parties. 102
By doing so the Court has infused into the common law, in this case the law of

97
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99

100
10 1
102

Id. at 112 (judgment of Justice O 'Regan).
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G. A. Res. 34/180 U.N.
GAOR, 34'" Sess., Supp. No. 46, U .N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sepe.
3, 1981).
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/CONE 157/23 July 12, 1993.
S v Baloyi, supra note 57.
ld. at 11.
Alix Jean Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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torts, the principles embodied in the Constitution. 103 In this case the police and
· prosecutors had recommended the release without bail of a man awaiting trial on
a charge of attempted rape, and who later brutally attacked another woman. The
Court held that the common law could be sufficiently developed to impose on
police and prosecutors a legal duty to protect such third parties, in light of the
Constitution and international law's prohibition on gender discrimination and
the right to dignity, freedom and security of women.J0 4
The Court has struck an impressive balance between the competing rights of
privacy and state regulation, 105 and religious rights and equality, 106 appreciating
the context of the lived realities and steadfastly held beliefs of individuals and
groups, and the need to create a society predicated on equality and dignity. In
the same vein the Court has tried to strike a healthy accord between the rights of
criminals in a very violent society, such as South Africa, and the rights of individuals to security of the person. 107
By far the most impress ive accomplishments of the Court has been its slow evolution of a socio-rights jurisprudence that attempts to redress the appalling economic
conditions within which a large number of South Africans still find themselves.
Mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers and not wish,ing to overcome the
prerogative of Parliament, the Court has nonetheless attempted to ensure that the
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S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 39, para. 2, provides that, " [w]hen interpreting any legislatio n and when developing the common law . .. every co urt, tribunal o r fo rum must pro mote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." (em ph asis added).
104
Alix Jean Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec., supra note I 02, para. 33.
105
See Nat'l Coal. for Gay and Lesb ian Equal. v Minister of Justice, supra note 85. See also De Reuck
v Dir. Pub. Prosec. (WL.D.) 2004 (I) SA 406 (CC) (S . Afr.) (finding a law prohibiting the importatio n and possession of child pornography to be a reasonable interference with privacy and
not overbroad, given an objective definition of child pornography whose primary element is the
stimulation of erotic rather than aesthetic feeling, and the presence of a good cause exemption fo r
individuals co nducting research on child pornography).
106
See C hristian Educ. S. Afr. v Minister of Educ. (4) SA 757 (CC) (S. Afr.) (recognizing that
corporal punishm ent in C hristian schools may constitute an important part of religious identity
and eth os, the Court nonetheless upheld a law of general applicability prohibiting corporal punishm ent in schools given the co mpelling public interest in protecting students from physical and
emotional abuse and what it viewed as a limited interference in th e ability of parents to otherwise follow their reli gious co nscience). See also Prince v Pres. of the Law Society of the Cape of
Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding the right of rhe Rastafarian religion rouse
cannabis as part of rhe reli gio us practice outweighed by the state's interest in enforcing drug legislation intended to curb its use).
107
See Alix Jean Carmichel e v Minister of Safety & Sec., mpra note 102. See also K v Minister of
Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) (S. Afr.).
.
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government addresses the needs of the poor in the country. In The Government ofthe
Republic ofSouth Africa, et al. v Grootboom and Others, 108 a case widely regarded as
international test case on the enforceability of social and economic rights, the Court
outlined in great detail the obligation of the government to provide housing for
those desperate for shelter. The case concerned an application for temporary shelter
brought by a group of people, including a number of children, who were without
shelter following their brutal eviction from private land on which they were squatting. The conditions under which the community lived were deplorable. They had
access to water through one tap that served hundreds of people, and no sanitation
facilities. The Court affirmed that the government had a duty in terms of Section 26
of the Constitution (the right to adequate housing) 109 to adopt reasonable policy,
legislative and budgetary measures to provide relief for people who have no access to
land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions. The
judgment also dealt in details with the implications of the children's socio-economic
rights enshrined in Section 28. 11 0
The Court dealt in some detail with the provisions in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and in particular
the articles that outline the substantive nature of the rights incorporated in the
Covenant as well as the obligations of states to take reasonable steps to realize
those rights. 111 Elaborating in the obligation in both ICESR and the South
African Constitution, the Court determined that the government had the duty
to respect, protect, promote and fulfill these rights. 11 2 In addition, the Court
examined the comments of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC), and particularly the comment that socio-economic rights contain a minimum core. 11 3 The Court, pointing out that ICESCR
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200 1 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) .
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 26 provides chat: "(l) Everyo ne has che right co have access co adequate housing. (2) The state muse cake reasonable legislative and ocher measures,
within its available resources, co achieve the progress ive realization of this right. (3) No one may
be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished .... "
11 0
Id.§ 28 covers a range of rights co which children are en titled, including bas ic nutrition, shelter,
basic health care and social services.
111
In particular, the Court analyzed § 11.1 of the Covenant, which provides chat the "[t]he Stace
parties co the present Covenant recognize the ri ght of everyone co an adequate standard of livi ng
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, ... The Seate parties
will cake appropriate steps co ensure the realization of chis right .. . ." § 2.1 of the Covenant provides that, "[e]ach State parry to the present Covenan t undertakes co cake seeps, . . . co che maximum of its available resources, with a view co achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the prese nt Covenant by al l appropriate means."
11 2
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 7, para. 2.
11 3
Gov'c of Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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. provides for the right to housing, whereas the South African Constitution provides a right of access co housing, rejected the "minimum core" approach and
instead opted for one chat imposed on the South African the requirement of reasonableness in its housing policy. 11 4 Although the Court engaged in an extensive
analysis of ICESR and the obligations as articulated by ECOSOC, the Court
concluded chat the concept "minimum core" did not create sufficient flexibility
and appreciation of the peculiar conditions of South Africa. 11 5
In line with its requirement of reasonableness, the Court has also mandated the
government, in compliance with the right to health as delineated in the Bill of
Rights, 11 6 as well as the rights of children, 11 7 to provide anti-retroviral drugs to
HIV-positive pregnant women at public hospitals throughout South Africa. 11 8 The
Court has also protected chose who are not South African citizens from violations
of their constitutional socio-economic rights, holding chat a scheme that excluded
permanent residents from social assistance was discriminatory and unfair. 11 9
The above analysis demonstrates the manner in which the Constitutional Court
has embraced international legal principles, and particularly with regard to . its
human rights, equality and socio-economic rights jurisprudence. And even though
the Court may not have adopted the methodological apprm1ches of the relevant
international human rights body, such as its diversion from that taken by the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the question of
the minimum core content of a right, the Court has for the most part embraced
both the substance and the spirit of the various international legal documents.
In some cases, however, the Court has found that resort to international law was
irrelevant or marginal co the determination of the constitutionality or otherwise of a
statute or other form of governmental action. 120 This was essentially the approach
11 4

11 5
11 6

Id. paras. 27-29. '
Id. para. 33.

S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 27 provides chat everyone "has che right co have access co
health care services, including reproductive heal ch care" and chat the ''state muse cake reasonable
legislative and ocher meas ures, within its avail able resources, co achieve ch e progressive realization of all of these ri ghts ...."
11 7
Gov'c of Republic of S. Afr. v. G roocboom, supra note 11 3.
11 8
Minister of H ealch v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (2) SA 72 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (fi nd ing
unreasonable the govern ment's refusal co make widely available the anti-retroviral drug nevirapine until it had further tested the safety and efficacy of che drug and its failure co sec o ut a time
frame for a national program co reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV).
119
Khosa v. Ministe r Soc. D ev.; Mahlaule v. M inister Soc. D ev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(findin g in the scheme a violation of the righ t co equ al ity as well as finding that the Co nstitution
vests a ri ght co social security in "everyon e").
120
For a thoughtful analysis of the way in which the Co nsticucional Cou rt "reads in and out" internation al law, see Cath erin e Adcock Admay, Constitutional Comity: Medfating the Rule of Law
Divide, 26 N.C. J. Inc'! & Com. Reg. 723 (2001).
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taken by the Court in a highly publicized case challenging both the constitutionality
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as well as its putative violation
of international law, 121 in particular, the international law requirement that those
who commit gross violations of human rights be punished as mandated by four
Geneva Conventions. 122 In this case the Court was faced by a challenge from family
m embers of those tortured and killed by the South African government, that the
empowering statute of the TRC, 123 and especially its amnesty committee, 124 was
both unconstitutional and in violation of international law. 125
The petitioners claimed that the well-established international legal principle,
that the perpetrator of gross violations of human rights has to compensate the
victim for the injuries suffered, are clearly violated by the amnesty provisions of
the T.R.C. 126 Regarding the constitutionality of the TRC statute, the petitioners
claimed that the amnesty provision immunized perpetrators of gross violations
of human rights from criminal and civil liability. This immunity applies as well
to those who might be held vicariously liable for the perpetrators' actions, including state autho rities. 127 These amnesty provisions clearly violated the Constitution,
which provided that:
Every perso n shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of
law, or where appropriate, another independent or impartial forum. 128
The petitioners argued that the amnesty committee was neither a "court of law"
nor an "independent or impartial forum", and that the amnesty committee was
not empowered to settle "justiciable disputes." 129 The petitioners relied on the
well establish ed international law principle that those who are victims of gross

12 1

AZAPO v Pres. of che Republic of S. Afr., supra note 3.
Article 49 of the first Geneva Co nventi on For che Amelioration of che Condition of che
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in che Field; Article 50 of the seco nd Geneva Co nvention
for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Fo rces at Sea;
Article 29 of the Third Ge neva Co nvention relative co the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and
Article 46 of the fourth Geneva Convention relative co the Protection of Civilian Persons durin g
time ofWar. See Id., para. 25.
123
Promotion of National Un ity and Reconciliation Ace No. 34 of 1995.
124
In terms of che statute, amn esty is co be granted co all "perso ns who make full disclos ure of all
the relevant faces relati ng co aces associated with a political objective . ... " Id.,§ 3(1)(6) .
125
AZAPO v Pres. of the Republic of S. Afr. , supra note 3, para. 25.
122

126
127

Id.

These am nesty provisions are contai ned in § 20 of the Promotion of National Un ity and
Reconci li ati on Act, supra note 123.
128
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 22.
129
AZAPO v Pres. of che Republic of S. Afr., supra note 3, para. 8.
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human righrs violations have the right of access to a legal forum to have their
claims considered and adjudicated. 130
In a detailed judgment, the Court in effect skirted the relevant international
legal principles by focusing only on the constitutionality of the TRC. Judge
Mahomed, writing for the majority, found that the TRC had in fact passed constitutional muster. Even though the Constitution clearly provided the right to
have "justiciable disputes settled by a court of law," the same section empowers
the South African government to provide amnesties for past wrongs where it is
deemed appropriate. 13 1
The holding in this case generated some controversy, as many commentators
were of the opinion that the Court gave short shrift to international law by refusing to engage with the relevant issues in its deliberations. 132 It is arguable that the
Court in fact followed the contextual approach it adopted in other cases, and
that the constitutional principles provided the Court with a sufficient basis on
which to dispose of the challenge to the TRC. The Court has also noted that
although the Constitution mandates the Court to consider international law, it
does not have to adopt such law.

E. Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the South African Constitution and its
Bill of Rights, coupled with an impressive equality and human rights jurisprudence generated by the Constitutional Court, has been admired widely. I tried to
demonstrate that healthy synergy between international legal principles and the
South African constitutional principles, and how each set injected into the other
the possibilities of human rights transformation. I also tried to demonstrate how
the Constitutional Court has been strategically mindful of its mandate under the
Constitution to consider international and foreign law, and to use international
law to pursue the agenda of transformation envisioned by the Constitution . But
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Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report Submitted by Mr. 1heo
Van Boven, Special Rapporteur, United Nations Human Rights Com missio n, U.N. Doc. El
CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 Quly 2, 1993).
13 1
S. AFR. CoNST. 1996, supra note 30, § 22.
132
See, e.g., John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: 7he South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
LEGAL & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 277 (1998); see also Z iyad Motala, 7he Constitutional Court's
Approach to International Law and its Method ofInterpretation in the 'Amnesty Decision'.· Intellectual
Honesty or Political Expediency? 21 SAYIL 29 (1996).
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the Court has also been mindful of the contextual realities of South Africa, and
has attempted to cultivate an indigenous human rights jurisprudence, that will
take root in South Africa even though it draws from international and comparative human rights principles.
Of course the human rights project in South Africa extends beyond the text of
the Bill of Rights or the deliberations of the Constitutional Court and other legal
bodies mandated to interpret and enforce the Bill of Rights. The reality of poverty and the gross economic inequalities so pervasive in South Africa threaten to
undermine the constitutional project. Moreover, the increasingly privatized
nature of the South African economy may corrode the possibilities generated by
the incorporation of socio-economic rights in the Constitution. In order for the
formal constitutional project to be effective, at the minimum it has to give rise to
a culture of human rights.
Just as apartheid was a concern of the global community, so too the contemporary constitutional project in South Africa generates significant global interest.
One aspect of the transformation process, that is, the formal incorporation of
human rights is underway. The challenge for South Africa is to translate those
formal rights into tangible political, social and economic rights .

